01397    a2200241   4500001001100000005001700011008003900028020001800067037003600085040000700121041000800128072001400136072001200150072002100162072002300183100002500206245002800231250000600259260003200265300001000297520083300307999001501140131725920320250317111612.0250312042015GB                   eng    a9781317259206  bTaylor & FranciscGBP 29.99fBB  a01  aeng7 aJP2thema7 aJP2bic7 aPOL0000002bisac7 a327.73051932bisac1 aWalter C. Clemens Jr10aGetting to Yes in Korea  a1  aOxfordbRoutledgec20151117  a256 p  bPresident George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an "axis of evil" but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward. Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.  c4993d4993