01956 a2200325 4500 1351818430 20250317111626.0 250312042018GB eng 9781351818438 Taylor & Francis GBP 22.99 BB 01 eng QDTQ thema QDTS thema JM thema QDTM thema MKMT thema HPQ bic HPS bic JM bic HPM bic MMJT bic PHI000000 bisac Ben Bramble Passing of Temporal Well-Being 1 Oxford Routledge 20180309 72 p The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: · lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and · temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time ( momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life ( periodic well-being). Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being 6261 6261