01956    a2200325   4500001001100000005001700011008003900028020001800067037003600085040000700121041000800128072001600136072001600152072001400168072001600182072001600198072001300214072001300227072001200240072001300252072001400265072002100279100001600300245003500316250000600351260003200357300000900389520121700398999001501615135181843020250317111626.0250312042018GB                   eng    a9781351818438  bTaylor & FranciscGBP 22.99fBB  a01  aeng7 aQDTQ2thema7 aQDTS2thema7 aJM2thema7 aQDTM2thema7 aMKMT2thema7 aHPQ2bic7 aHPS2bic7 aJM2bic7 aHPM2bic7 aMMJT2bic7 aPHI0000002bisac1 aBen Bramble10aPassing of Temporal Well-Being  a1  aOxfordbRoutledgec20180309  a72 p  bThe philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: · lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and · temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time ( momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life ( periodic well-being). Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being  c6261d6261