02546 a2200433 4500001001100000005001700011008003900028020001800067037003600085040000700121041000800128072001400136072001600150072001500166072001500181072001500196072001600211072001400227072001200241072001400253072001300267072001300280072001300293072001300306072001200319072002100331072002100352072002100373072002100394072002100415072001900436100002600455245009500481250000600576260003200582300001000614520147300624999001502097135170985220250317111638.0250312042018GB eng  a9781351709859 bTaylor & FranciscGBP 43.99fBB a01 aeng7 aLB2thema7 aLNKJ2thema7 aRNA2thema7 aPST2thema7 aRNC2thema7 aQDTQ2thema7 aLA2thema7 aLB2bic7 aLNKJ2bic7 aRNA2bic7 aPST2bic7 aRNC2bic7 aHPQ2bic7 aLA2bic7 aLAW0000002bisac7 aLAW0340002bisac7 aLAW0510002bisac7 aNAT0100002bisac7 aPHI0340002bisac7 a344.0462bisac1 aMoa De Lucia Dahlbeck10aSpinoza, Ecology and International LawbRadical Naturalism in the Face of the Anthropocene a1 aOxfordbRoutledgec20180912 a196 p bThis book addresses the use of Benedict Spinoza’s philosophy in current attempts to elaborate an ecological basis for international environmental law. Because the question of environmental protection has not been satisfactory resolved, the legal debate concerning our responsibility for the environment has – as evidenced in the recent UN report series Harmony with Nature – come to invite calls for a new eco-centric, rather than anthropocentric, legal paradigm. In this respect, Spinoza appears as a key figure. He is one of the few philosophers in the history of western philosophy who cares, and writes extensively, about the roots of anthropocentrism; the core issue of contemporary normative debates in ecology. And in response to the rapidly developing ecological crisis, his work has become central to a re-thinking of the human relationship with nature. Addressing the contention that Spinoza’s ethics might provide a useful source for developing a new, eco-centred framework for environmental law, this book elaborates a more nuanced understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy. Spinoza cannot, it is argued here, simply be reduced to an eco-ethicist. That is: his metaphysics cannot be used as basis of an essentially naturalised or extended human morality. At the same time, however, this book argues that the radicality of Spinoza’s naturalism nevertheless offers the possibility of developing a more adequate ecological basis for environmental law. c7348d7348