02138 a2200337 4500001001100000005001700011008004000028020001800068037003600086040000700122041000800129072001500137072001600152072001400168072001300182072001300195072001200208072002100220072002100241072002100262072002100283072001700304100001900321245003100340250000600371260003200377300001000409520134600419700002201765999001301787103208439120250317100359.0250312042021GB 1 eng  a9781032084398 bTaylor & FranciscGBP 41.99fBB a01 aeng7 aPDA2thema7 aQDTQ2thema7 aPS2thema7 aPDA2bic7 aHPQ2bic7 aPS2bic7 aSOC0260002bisac7 aSOC0390002bisac7 aSOC0430002bisac7 aSOC0520002bisac7 a171.72bisac1 aMichael Stingl10aEvolutionary Moral Realism a1 aOxfordbRoutledgec20210630 a192 p bAgainst standard approaches to evolution and ethics, this book develops the idea that moral values may find their origin in regularly recurring features in the cooperative environments of species of organisms that are social and intelligent. Across a wide range of species that are social and intelligent, possibilities arise for helping others, responding empathetically to the needs of others, and playing fairly. The book identifies these underlying environmental regularities as biological natural kinds and as natural moral values. As natural kinds, moral values help to provide more complete explanations for the selection of traits that arise in response to them. For example, helping in an aquatic environment is quite different than helping in an arboreal environment, and so we can expect the selection of traits for helping to reflect these underlying environmental differences. With the human ability to name, talk, and reason about important features of our environment, moral values become part of moral discourse and argument, helping to produce coherent systems of moral thought. Combining a naturalistic approach to morality with an equal emphasis on moral argument and truth, this book will be of interest to philosophers and historians of biology, theoretical biologists, comparative psychologists, and moral philosophers.1 aJohn Collier4A01 c990d990