000			01669 a2200241 4500
001			1317462432
005			20250317100411.0
008			250312042015GB eng
020			_a9781317462439
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 45.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aJPS _2thema
072	7		_aJPS _2bic
072	7		_aPOL000000 _2bisac
072	7		_a327.47 _2bisac
100	1		_aOfira Seliktar
245	1	0	_aPolitics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures _bWhy So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20150520
300			_a296 p
520			_bWashington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of "who won" the Cold War. Like the disputes over "who lost" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of "Sovietology" has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporaneous literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary.
999			_c2353 _d2353