000			01881 a2200337 4500
001			1138998125
005			20250317100416.0
008			250312042016GB eng
020			_a9781138998124
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 45.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aJP _2thema
072	7		_aGTM _2thema
072	7		_aJB _2thema
072	7		_aKC _2thema
072	7		_a1FB _2bisac
072	7		_aJP _2bic
072	7		_aGTB _2bic
072	7		_aJF _2bic
072	7		_aKC _2bic
072	7		_a1FB _2bisac
072	7		_aSOC053000 _2bisac
072	7		_a327.4705691 _2bisac
100	1		_aEfraim Karsh
245	1	0	_aSoviet Union and Syria (RLE Syria)
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20160121
300			_a134 p
520			_bThis Chatham House Paper examines the nature of Soviet relations with Syria, assessing the commitments made and the gains reaped by Moscow and Damascus in the economic, military and political spheres. After discussing Soviet interests in the region in general and with regard to Syria in particular, the author traces the evolution of the relationship between Moscow and its major Middle Eastern ally since Asad came to power in 1970. While the study argues that huge Soviet military aid has intensified the pro-Soviet alignment of Syrian policy, it contends that Asad’s perception of his country’s national interests has also played a large part in shaping the relationship. The author concludes that both sides have gained from what is an interdependent relationship. If Damascus remains almost wholly dependent on Soviet military aid, regional constraints give Syria some leverage over Moscow. Without Moscow’s support Syria might perhaps not have played such a leading role in the region; without Damascus the Soviet Union might have found itself on the sidelines of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
999			_c2966 _d2966