000			01752 a2200349 4500
001			113899653X
005			20250317100417.0
008			250312042015GB eng
020			_a9781138996533
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 45.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aNHWR5 _2thema
072	7		_aJP _2thema
072	7		_aJWA _2thema
072	7		_a3MPBF _2bisac
072	7		_a3M _2bisac
072	7		_aHBWN _2bic
072	7		_aJP _2bic
072	7		_aJWA _2bic
072	7		_a3J _2bisac
072	7		_aHIS037070 _2bisac
072	7		_aHIS027090 _2bisac
072	7		_aHIS000000 _2bisac
072	7		_a940.322 _2bisac
100	1		_aKeith Neilson
245	1	0	_aStrategy and Supply (RLE The First World War) _bThe Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914-1917
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20151221
300			_a350 p
520			_bBased on a wide range of primary sources, this book shows the way in which diplomacy, economics, finance and strategy became intertwined during the First World War. The author examines the diplomatic, economic, financial and military relations between Britain and Russia and argues that the key to understanding the alliance is the British determination to win the war and the role Russia played in achieving this aim. British strategy is shown to be more the result of her relations with her allies, especially during the first years of the war, than a quarrel between East and West. This revision of the accepted interpretation of the strategy leads to a reassessment of the views of Lloyd George, Kitchener and Grey. The author concludes that in 1917 the British interest in Russia remained as it was earlier in the war: the maintenance of a powerful ally on the eastern front.
999			_c3024 _d3024