000 01873 a2200313 4500
001 0367426129
005 20250317100419.0
008 250312042021GB eng
020 _a9780367426125
037 _bTaylor & Francis
_cGBP 32.99
_fBB
040 _a01
041 _aeng
072 7 _aQDTL
_2thema
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072 7 _a160
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100 1 _aJ. A. Faris
245 1 0 _aTruth-Functional Logic
250 _a1
260 _aOxford
_bRoutledge
_c20210331
300 _a130 p
520 _bOriginally published in 1962. This book gives an account of the concepts and methods of a basic part of logic. In chapter I elementary ideas, including those of truth-functional argument and truth-functional validity, are explained. Chapter II begins with a more comprehensive account of truth-functionality; the leading characteristics of the most important monadic and dyadic truth-functions are described, and the different notations in use are set forth. The main part of the book describes and explains three different methods of testing truth-functional aguments and agument forms for validity: the truthtable method, the deductive method and the method of normal forms; for the benefit mainly of readers who have not acquired in one way or another a general facility in the manipulation of symbols some of the procedures have been described in rather more detail than is common in texts of this kind. In the final chapter the author discusses and rejects the view, based largely on the so called paradoxes of material implication, that truth-functional logic is not applicable in any really important way to arguments of ordinary discourse.
999 _c3230
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