000			02039 a2200385 4500
001			1317132963
005			20250317111611.0
008			250312042019GB eng
020			_a9781317132967
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 41.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aLAB _2thema
072	7		_aJKV _2thema
072	7		_aLNT _2thema
072	7		_aLNF _2thema
072	7		_aQDTS _2thema
072	7		_aQDHR _2thema
072	7		_aLAB _2bic
072	7		_aJKV _2bic
072	7		_aLNT _2bic
072	7		_aLNF _2bic
072	7		_aHPS _2bic
072	7		_aHPCF _2bic
072	7		_aLAW000000 _2bisac
072	7		_aLAW036000 _2bisac
072	7		_a340.1 _2bisac
100	1		_aAllan McCay
245	1	0	_aFree Will and the Law _bNew Perspectives
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20190221
300			_a238 p
520			_bThis volume brings together many of the world’s leading theorists of free will and philosophers of law to critically discuss the ground-breaking contribution of David Hodgson’s libertarianism and its application to philosophy of law. The book begins with a comprehensive introduction, providing an overview of the intersection of theories of free will and philosophy of law over the last fifty years. The eleven chapters collected together divide into two groups: the first five address libertarianism within the free will debate, with particular attention to Hodgson’s theory, and in Part II, six contributors discuss Hodgson’s libertarianism in relation to issues not often pursued by free will scholars, such as mitigation of punishment, the responsibility of judges, the nature of judicial reasoning and the criminal law process more generally. Thus the volume’s importance lies not only in examining Hodgson’s distinctive libertarian theory from within the free will literature, but also in considering new directions for research in applying that theory to enduring questions about legal responsibility and punishment.
700	1		_aMichael Sevel _4B01
999			_c4909 _d4909