000			01397 a2200241 4500
001			131725919X
005			20250317111612.0
008			250312042015GB eng
020			_a9781317259190
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 29.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aJP _2thema
072	7		_aJP _2bic
072	7		_aPOL000000 _2bisac
072	7		_a327.7305193 _2bisac
100	1		_aWalter C. Clemens Jr
245	1	0	_aGetting to Yes in Korea
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20151117
300			_a256 p
520			_bPresident George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an "axis of evil" but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward. Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.
999			_c4992 _d4992