000			02097 a2200337 4500
001			1138873489
005			20250317100355.0
008			250312042015GB eng
020			_a9781138873483
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 49.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aGTM _2thema
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072	7		_aJPWS _2thema
072	7		_a1FM _2bisac
072	7		_aGTB _2bic
072	7		_aJW _2bic
072	7		_aJPWS _2bic
072	7		_a1FM _2bisac
072	7		_aHIS027000 _2bisac
072	7		_aPOL004000 _2bisac
072	7		_aPOL012000 _2bisac
072	7		_a305.8 _2bisac
100	1		_aBrian Shoup
245	1	0	_aConflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States _bInstitutional Incentives, Myths and Counter-Balancing
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20150410
300			_a208 p
520			_bInterethnic competition in plural societies is often characterized by a ‘counterbalance’ of political and economic strength between different groups. In such cases, tensions emerge as politically dominant groups fear loss of hegemony to more economically aggressive groups. Likewise, economically successful groups require key public goods and a political atmosphere conducive to investment. These social relations are couched in terms of ethnic mythologies that stress the indigenous role of one group, and consequently its superior political status. This book develops a model that explains how and why interethnic bargains between rival groups can erode given different institutional configurations. It is hypothesized that interethnic conflict is more likely in countries where political institutions fail to insulate the political hegemony of traditionally dominant ethnic communities and redistributive programs fail to improve the economic position of ethnic majorities. In such cases, outbidding strategies by more extreme ethnic leaders are more successful and violence becomes more likely. Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States will be of interest to students of ethnic conflict, Asian politics and security studies.
999			_c590 _d590