000 01689 a2200313 4500
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008 250312042017GB eng
020 _a9781317239307
037 _bTaylor & Francis
_cGBP 42.99
_fBB
040 _a01
041 _aeng
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_2thema
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072 7 _a170
_2bisac
100 1 _aDiego E. Machuca
245 1 0 _aMoral Skepticism
_bNew Essays
250 _a1
260 _aOxford
_bRoutledge
_c20171020
300 _a252 p
520 _bMoral skepticism is at present a vibrant topic of philosophical inquiry. Particularly since the turn of the millennium, the debates between moral skeptics of various stripes and their opponents have gained renewed force not only by taking account of innovative ideas in moral philosophy, but also by drawing on novel positions in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language as well as on recent findings in empirical sciences. As a result, new arguments for and against moral skepticism have been devised, while the traditional ones have been reexamined. This collection of original essays will advance the ongoing debates about various forms of moral skepticism by discussing such topics as error theory, disagreement, constructivism, non-naturalism, expressivism, fictionalism, and evolutionary debunking arguments. It will be a valuable resource for academics and advanced students working in metaethics and moral philosophy more generally.
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