000			01956 a2200325 4500
001			1351818430
005			20250317111626.0
008			250312042018GB eng
020			_a9781351818438
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 22.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
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100	1		_aBen Bramble
245	1	0	_aPassing of Temporal Well-Being
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20180309
300			_a72 p
520			_bThe philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: · lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person’s life was for him or her considered as a whole, and · temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time ( momentary well-being) or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, a day, month, year, or chapter of a life ( periodic well-being). Many theories have been offered of each of these kinds of well-being. A common view is that lifetime well-being is in some way constructed out of temporal well-being. This book argues that much of this literature is premised on a mistake. Lifetime well-being cannot be constructed out of temporal well-being, because there is no such thing as temporal well-being. The only genuine kind of well-being is lifetime well-being. The Passing of Temporal Well-Being will prove essential reading for professional philosophers, especially in moral and political philosophy. It will also be of interest to welfare economists and policy-makers who appeal to well-being
999			_c6261 _d6261