000			02015 a2200361 4500
001			1317226410
005			20250317111631.0
008			250312042017GB 20 eng
020			_a9781317226413
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 44.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
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072	7		_a347.7314 _2bisac
100	1		_aC. Scott Peters
245	1	0	_aRegulating Judicial Elections _bAssessing State Codes of Judicial Conduct
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20170905
300			_a176 p
520			_bState judicial elections are governed by a unique set of rules that enforce longstanding norms of judicial independence by limiting how judicial candidates campaign. These rules have been a key part of recent debates over judicial elections and have been the subject of several U.S. Supreme Court cases. Regulating Judicial Elections provides the first accounting of the efficacy and consequences of such rules. C. Scott Peters re-frames debates over judicial elections by shifting away from all-or-nothing claims about threats to judicial independence and focusing instead on the trade-offs inherent in our checks and balances system. In doing so, he is able to examine the costs and benefits of state ethical restrictions. Peters finds that while some parts of state codes of conduct achieve their desired goals, others may backfire and increase the politicization of judicial elections. Moreover, modest gains in the protection of independence come at the expense of the effectiveness of elections as accountability mechanisms. These empirical findings will inform ongoing normative debates about judicial elections.
999			_c6728 _d6728