000			02155 a2200337 4500
001			1315302586
005			20250317111637.0
008			250312042016GB 3 eng
020			_a9781315302584
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 44.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
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100	1		_aAdam Green
245	1	0	_aSocial Contexts of Intellectual Virtue _bKnowledge as a Team Achievement
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20161208
300			_a256 p
520			_bThis book reconceives virtue epistemology in light of the conviction that we are essentially social creatures. Virtue is normally thought of as something that allows individuals to accomplish things on their own. Although contemporary ethics is increasingly making room for an inherently social dimension in moral agency, intellectual virtues continue to be seen in terms of the computing potential of a brain taken by itself. Thinking in these terms, however, seriously misconstrues the way in which our individual flourishing hinges on our collective flourishing. Green’s account of virtue epistemology is based on the extended credit view, which conceives of knowledge as an achievement and broadens that focus to include team achievements in addition to individual ones. He argues that this view does a better job than alternatives of answering the many conceptual and empirical challenges for virtue epistemology that have been based on cases of testimony. The view also allows for a nuanced interaction with situationist psychology, dual processing models in cognitive science, and the extended mind literature in philosophy of mind. This framework provides a useful conceptual bridge between individual and group epistemology, and it has novel applications to the epistemology of disagreement, prejudice, and authority.
999			_c7250 _d7250