000			02197 a2200313 4500
001			1317506227
005			20250317111642.0
008			250312042015GB 84 eng
020			_a9781317506225
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 41.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
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100	1		_aYanlong Zhang
245	1	0	_aTrust and Economics _bThe Co-evolution of Trust and Exchange Systems
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20150626
300			_a146 p
520			_bA lot of recent attention has been given to one of the central paradoxes of trust: namely how people can restrict self-interest in order to trust. Existing perspectives, theories, and models offer partial explanations, but this volume presents a novel framework that expands on the findings of recent studies of trust and exchange. This book offers a new angle for the understanding of exchange and trust in an interactive context, describes the interactive characteristics of trust in exchange systems, and develops a theory explaining the co-evolution of trust and exchange systems. A new framework is used to incorporate the theory of systems of trust and evolutionary game-theoretical approach to investigate four important questions: How can trust emerge in exchange when people pursue self-interest? After its emergence, how does exchange affect trust in a dynamic process? When are dynamics of trust stable? Do interactive trust phenomena differ under different exchange systems? This book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the theoretical findings for three areas: the improvement of trust, potential economic growth, and mechanism design in exchange systems. This volume makes a significant contribution to the literature on evolutionary and institutional economics and is suitable for those who have an interest in political economy, economy theory and philosophy as well as economic psychology.
999			_c7663 _d7663