000			01727 a2200253 4500
001			1351754858
005			20250317111642.0
008			250312042017GB eng
020			_a9781351754859
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 52.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aJHB _2thema
072	7		_aJHB _2bic
072	7		_aSOC000000 _2bisac
072	7		_aSOC026000 _2bisac
072	7		_a128.37 _2bisac
100	1		_aPeter Goldie
245	1	0	_aUnderstanding Emotions _bMind and Morals
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20171101
300			_a146 p
520			_bThis title was first published in 2002: At the end of the 20th century, the emotions ceased to be a neglected topic for philosophical consideration. The editor suggests that this may, in part, be due to a change in the way the subject is approached. The emotions were characteristically thought of by philosophers as states which give rise to perturbation in what might roughly be called "right-thinking". The basic idea was that practical reasoning, like theoretical reasoning, ought to be, and can be, dispassionate. This means that either the emotions interfere with "right-reasoning" in a way which is a proper object of study for the biological sciences but not for the science of the mind, or that the emotions become reducible to, and analyzable as, collections of propositional attitudes which are themselves assessable in terms of "right-reasoning". The move away from this idea is taken as an improvement in our philosophical approach to the emotions by the authors. Following this, all of the papers in the volume contribute to this philosophical approach, each approaching the subject from a different angle.
999			_c7703 _d7703