000			02138 a2200337 4500
001			1032084391
005			20250317100359.0
008			250312042021GB 1 eng
020			_a9781032084398
037			_bTaylor & Francis _cGBP 41.99 _fBB
040			_a01
041			_aeng
072	7		_aPDA _2thema
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072	7		_aPS _2thema
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072	7		_a171.7 _2bisac
100	1		_aMichael Stingl
245	1	0	_aEvolutionary Moral Realism
250			_a1
260			_aOxford _bRoutledge _c20210630
300			_a192 p
520			_bAgainst standard approaches to evolution and ethics, this book develops the idea that moral values may find their origin in regularly recurring features in the cooperative environments of species of organisms that are social and intelligent. Across a wide range of species that are social and intelligent, possibilities arise for helping others, responding empathetically to the needs of others, and playing fairly. The book identifies these underlying environmental regularities as biological natural kinds and as natural moral values. As natural kinds, moral values help to provide more complete explanations for the selection of traits that arise in response to them. For example, helping in an aquatic environment is quite different than helping in an arboreal environment, and so we can expect the selection of traits for helping to reflect these underlying environmental differences. With the human ability to name, talk, and reason about important features of our environment, moral values become part of moral discourse and argument, helping to produce coherent systems of moral thought. Combining a naturalistic approach to morality with an equal emphasis on moral argument and truth, this book will be of interest to philosophers and historians of biology, theoretical biologists, comparative psychologists, and moral philosophers.
700	1		_aJohn Collier _4A01
999			_c990 _d990