Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures (Record no. 2353)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01669 a2200241 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1317462432
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250317100411.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250312042015GB eng
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781317462439
037 ## - SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
Source of stock number/acquisition Taylor & Francis
Terms of availability GBP 45.99
Form of issue BB
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency 01
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JPS
Source thema
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JPS
Source bic
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code POL000000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code 327.47
Source bisac
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Ofira Seliktar
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures
Remainder of title Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 20150520
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 296 p
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Expansion of summary note Washington's failure to foresee the collapse of its superpower rival ranks high in the pantheon of predictive failures. The question of who got what right or wrong has been intertwined with the deeper issue of "who won" the Cold War. Like the disputes over "who lost" China and Iran, this debate has been fought out along ideological and partisan lines, with conservatives claiming credit for the Evil Empire's demise and liberals arguing that the causes were internal to the Soviet Union. The intelligence community has come in for harsh criticism for overestimating Soviet strength and overlooking the symptoms of crisis; the discipline of "Sovietology" has dissolved into acrimonious irrelevance. Drawing on declassified documents, interviews, and careful analysis of contemporaneous literature, this book offers the first systematic analysis of this predictive failure at the paradigmatic, foreign policy, and intelligence levels. Although it is focused on the Soviet case, it offers lessons that are both timely and necessary.

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