Scepticism (Record no. 7096)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01909 a2200241 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1317489705
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250317111636.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250312042014GB eng
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781317489702
037 ## - SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
Source of stock number/acquisition Taylor & Francis
Terms of availability GBP 49.99
Form of issue BB
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency 01
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code QDTK
Source thema
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code HPK
Source bic
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PHI000000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code 149.91
Source bisac
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Neil Gascoigne
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Scepticism
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 20141218
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 224 p
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Expansion of summary note The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry.

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