Understanding Emotions (Record no. 7703)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01727 a2200253 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1351754858
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250317111642.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250312042017GB eng
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781351754859
037 ## - SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
Source of stock number/acquisition Taylor & Francis
Terms of availability GBP 52.99
Form of issue BB
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency 01
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JHB
Source thema
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JHB
Source bic
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code SOC000000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code SOC026000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code 128.37
Source bisac
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Peter Goldie
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Understanding Emotions
Remainder of title Mind and Morals
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 20171101
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 146 p
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Expansion of summary note This title was first published in 2002: At the end of the 20th century, the emotions ceased to be a neglected topic for philosophical consideration. The editor suggests that this may, in part, be due to a change in the way the subject is approached. The emotions were characteristically thought of by philosophers as states which give rise to perturbation in what might roughly be called "right-thinking". The basic idea was that practical reasoning, like theoretical reasoning, ought to be, and can be, dispassionate. This means that either the emotions interfere with "right-reasoning" in a way which is a proper object of study for the biological sciences but not for the science of the mind, or that the emotions become reducible to, and analyzable as, collections of propositional attitudes which are themselves assessable in terms of "right-reasoning". The move away from this idea is taken as an improvement in our philosophical approach to the emotions by the authors. Following this, all of the papers in the volume contribute to this philosophical approach, each approaching the subject from a different angle.

No items available.