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Getting to Yes in Korea (Record no. 1219)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01397 a2200241 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1594514070
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250317100401.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250312042010GB eng
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781594514074
037 ## - SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
Source of stock number/acquisition Taylor & Francis
Terms of availability GBP 29.99
Form of issue BB
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency 01
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JP
Source thema
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code JP
Source bic
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code POL000000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code 327.7305193
Source bisac
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Walter C. Clemens Jr
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Getting to Yes in Korea
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 20100630
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 256 p
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Expansion of summary note President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an "axis of evil" but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward. Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.

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