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Explaining Right and Wrong (Record no. 4805)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01885 a2200253 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 1351392077
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20250317111609.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 250312042017GB eng
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781351392075
037 ## - SOURCE OF ACQUISITION
Source of stock number/acquisition Taylor & Francis
Terms of availability GBP 42.99
Form of issue BB
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency 01
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code QDTQ
Source thema
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code HPQ
Source bic
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PHI000000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code PHI005000
Source bisac
072 7# - SUBJECT CATEGORY CODE
Subject category code 170.44
Source bisac
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Benjamin Sachs
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Explaining Right and Wrong
Remainder of title A New Moral Pluralism and Its Implications
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT
Edition statement 1
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxford
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 20171128
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 200 p
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Expansion of summary note Explaining Right and Wrong aims to shake the foundations of contemporary ethics by showing that moral philosophers have been deploying a mistaken methodology in their efforts to figure out the truth about what we morally ought to do. Benjamin Sachs argues that moral theorizing makes sense only if it is conceived of as an explanatory project and carried out accordingly. The book goes on to show that the most prominent forms of moral monism—consequentialism, Kantianism, and contractarianism/contractualism—as well as Rossian pluralism, each face devastating explanatory objections. It offers in place of these flawed options a brand-new family of normative ethical theories, non-Rossian pluralism. It then argues that the best kind of non-Rossian pluralism will be spare; in particular, it will deny that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to distribute welfare in a particular way or that an action can be wrong in virtue of constituting a failure to rescue. Furthermore, it also aims to show that a great deal of contemporary writing on the distribution of health care resources in cases of scarcity is targeted at questions that either have no answers at all or none that ordinary moral theorizing can uncover.

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